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When life imitates the media, the results can be disastrous.' This is
especially true when individuals are imitating movies, television shows, and
books that sensationalize violence. in the aftermath of recent school
shootings and terrorist attacks, there has been heightened concern about the
violent images portrayed in the media, and its ability to desensitize people to
the consequences of such violence. In the past twenty years, there has been
an increase in the number of claims against the entertainment industry
alleging that the industry should be held liable for the violent acts committed
by viewers, readers, and listeners.2 However, the First Amendment has been
used to bar tort liability in a vast majority of such cases.3
I J.D., May 2002, University of Miami School of Law; BA. 1999, University of Florida. The
author would like to thank her family and friends for their love and support. The author also wishes to
thank Professor Vivian Montz for her assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1993).
" See Carolina A. Fornos, Inspiring the Audience to Kill: Should the Entertainment Industry Be Held
Liablefor Intentional Acts of Violence Committed By Viewers, Listeners, or Readers?, 46 LOY. L. REv. 441 (2000).
3 See Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1982); McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr.
187 (Ct. App. 1988); Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), Watters v. TSR, 904 F.2d
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Part I of this Comment reviews the First Amendment, and how the
Brandenburg test4 applies to media liability cases. Part II discusses media
liability cases and the likelihood of a plaintiff bringing a successful claim
against the entertainment industry. Part III argues that tort liability is not the
appropriate method for deciding media violence cases since it intrudes on
First Amendment rights. This section will also examine the implications of
the Rice v. Paladin' decision on the entertainment industry in the future. Part
IV will discuss the entertainment industry's marketing practices, and their
system of self-regulation. Finally, Part V will discuss the industry's present
task of making adjustments in response to the recent terrorist attacks on our
country.
I. MEDIA VIOLENCE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances." 6 Historically, there has been an "overriding constitutional
principle that materials communicated by the public media... including
artistic expressions" 7 such as films, books, and music, are afforded protection
from governmental restrictions under the First Amendment. When deciding
cases that deal with speech that advocates harm, courts have consistently
applied the Brandenburg test, which protects political speech and abstract
advocacy of lawlessness.' This test, formulated in the case Brandenburg v.
Ohio, represents the present status of freedom of speech.9
In Brandenburg, the defendant was a leader of an Ohio Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) group who invited the press to attend a KKK rally." At the rally, the
defendant stated the KKK was "not a revengent organization, but if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it is possible that there might be some revengeance
taken."" Because of his speech, the defendant was charged with violating
378 (6th Cir. 1990); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989); Zamora
v. CBS, 480 F.Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
4 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
s See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
McColumn, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
8 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
9 Id. at 444.
10 Id. at 444-45.
I Id. at 446.
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Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Statute.12 The Supreme Court struck down
the Ohio statute, finding the words of the defendant were no more than
mere advocacy of abstract doctrine."
In doing so, the court articulated new requirements for statutes
proscribing speech. 4 Under Brandenburg, speech advocating the use of force
or crime could only be proscribed where two conditions were satisfied: (1)
The advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action;"
and (2) The advocacy is also "likely to incite or produce such action.: 5
Since Brandenburg, the Supreme Court has decided other cases that
present additional illustrations of the modern requirements of: (1)
Incitement (as opposed to abstract advocacy); and (2) Imminent harm (as
opposed to remote harm). 6 One instance is Hess v. Indiana.7 This case grew
out of a campus anti-war demonstration in which demonstrators blocked a
street until the police moved them away.'" The defendant then said, "we'll
take the fucking street later (or again)."' 9 The Court held that the
defendant's statement was "nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at
some indefinite future time."" The Court also stated the speech at issue
needs to be directed to a specific person or group.2 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that since only words intended and likely to produce imminent
disorder could be punished, the defendant's words were protected by the
First Amendment."
The Supreme Court again demonstrated the Brandenburg incitement test
would be rigorously applied in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.23 This case
involved a boycott against white merchants by black citizens in a Mississippi
county. During a public speech, a NAACP leader speaking in favor of the
12 Id. at 445. The Ohio statute punished all advocacy of the "duty, necessity, or propriety of crime
or violence... as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform." Id.
13 Id. at 448-49.
14 Id. at 447. Before Brandenburg, using the clear and present danger test drew the line between
legal advocacy and illegal incitement of criminal acts. This test was first used in Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919) (stating that the issue was "whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent").
is Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
16 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982) (Claiborne).
17 Hess, 414 U.S. 105.
Is Id. at 106.
19 Id.
10 Id. at 108.
21 Id.
Id. at 108-09.
23 Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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boycott stated, "if we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores,
we're going to break your damn neck."24 The Court reversed the lower
court's verdict for damages against the speaker. In doing so, the Court
concluded that the NAACP leader's speech did not constitute incitement,
and was therefore afforded protection under the First Amendment.25 The
Court acknowledged the NAACP leader had used strong language, but held
"an advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and
emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause."
26
IX. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRANDENBURG STANDARD FOR
MEDIA VIOLENCE CASES
The tension between allowing artists to express their ideas and the
danger of imitation has increased dramatically in recent years. The number
of mimicry cases that have come before the court has increased as well.
Many of these cases were brought under a negligence theory of tort liability
in which plaintiffs alleged the media defendant failed to protect the victims
from a foreseeable harm.' Since thecourts have traditionally applied the two
part Brandenburg standard, a majority of claims against the entertainment
industry for liability in relation to violent or dangerous acts have failed to
prove the requirements necessary for success.28 In applying the Brandenburg
standard, courts have typically held the media work in question was not
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action," and/or that the
advocacy was not "likely to incite or produce such action."- Recently,
however, the court has relaxed the imminent requirement of the Brandenburg
standard, especially when the media involves speech that seems to directly aid
and abet crime.'
The following cases represent how courts traditionally deny plaintiffs'
claims against the entertainment industry due to the strong First Amendment
protection often approved in media-related cases. These cases will be
grouped into the following categories: Motion Picture Cases, Television
Broadcasting Cases, Music Cases, Game Cases, and Classified
Advertisements/Commercial Speech Cases.
24 Id. at 902.
2 Id. at 928.
26 Id.
Z7 See David C. Kiernan, Shall the Sins of the Son Be Visited Upon the Father? Video Game
Manufacturer Liability fr Violent Video Games, 52 HASTINGS LJ. 207,227 (2000).
2S See Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888; McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187; Waller, 763 F. Supp. 1144;
Watters, 904 F.2d 378; Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d 1067; Zamora, 480 F. Supp. 199.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
30 See Rice, 128 F.3d 233. See also Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
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A. Motion Picture Cases
In Yakubowicz v. Paramount," a young man who had just seen the violent
movie, The Warriors, stabbed Martin Yakubowicz to death.3 2 Before killing
Yakubowicz, the assailant said to him "I want you, I'm going to get you,"
allegedly in imitation of a scene from the movie.33 Consequently, the victim's
father brought a wrongful death action against Paramount.34 The plaintiff
alleged that Paramount produced, distributed, and advertised The Warriors in
such a way as to "induce film viewers to commit violence in imitation of the
violence in the film."
35
The plaintiff also alleged that Paramount caused the death of his son by
"continuing to exhibit the film" after learning of other violent acts that
occurred at or near movie theaters showing The Warriors.36 Moreover, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the death
of his son. 37 The lower court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
In considering whether a duty of care existed,3 the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts determined the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to
the public, includingYakubowicz, with "respect to the producing, exhibiting
and advertising of movies." 39 However, the court concluded that based on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the defendant did not violate their
31 Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d 1067.
32 Id. at 1068. The film included numerous violent scenes in which "a juvenile gang, 'the
warriors,' was chased through the subways of New York with guns, knives, and other weapons." Id. at
1069.
33 Id. at 1070.
34 Id. at 1068.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1070.
38 "In determining whether the law ought to provide that a duty of care is owed by one person
to another, we look to existing social values and customs, and to appropriate social policy." Id. at 1070.
See also Delgado v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 838 (1999), in which parents, whose son was
fatally shot by a 13-year old who had just watched the violent R-rated movie, Dead Presidents, sued the
theater owner for negligence. The court rejected the parents' allegation that that the theater owner
violated a duty of care to the public when the theater failed to determine whether the teenager, who was
unaccompanied adult, was old enough to see the movie. Id. at 840. The court stated that "measured by
its goal of protecting children from objectionable films, the movie-rating system's duty flows to parents;
it was not designed or intended to protect society at large." Id. at 841.
Yakubovicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1067,1070.
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duty of reasonable care.' The court stated that motion pictures are a
"significant medium for the communication of ideas,"4 and that The Warriors
did not fall within the recognized exceptions to the First Amendment 2
The plaintiff also tried to argue that The Warriors fell within the
incitement exception of the First Amendment. However, the court
concluded that the film did not constitute incitement based on its viewing of
the movie.43 The court, in explaining its reasoning, stated that "although the
film is rife with violent scenes, it does not at any point exhort, urge, or
encourage unlawful or violent activity on the part of viewers. " 44 Moreover,
the movie did not "purport to order or command anyone to any concrete
action at any specific time, much less immediately."-'
B. Television Broadcasting Cases
In Zamora v. CBS,46 15-year old Ronnie Zamora, shot and killed his 83-
year old neighbor. As a result, his family brought an action against the
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS), and American Broadcasting Company (ABC) for damages on the
theory that Zamora had become "involuntarily addicted to and completely
subliminally intoxicated" by the viewing of television violence that was
shown on the defendants' networks. 47 The plaintiffs charged the networks
with breaching their duty to use ordinary care "to prevent Ronnie Zamora
from being impermissibly stimulated, incited, and instigated to duplicate the
atrocities he viewed on television."" There was, however, no allegation that
a particular program incited Ronny Zamora to kill his neighbor. Nor was
40 See id.; See also Bill v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 630 (Ct. App. 1982) (stating that if
the producers of an allegedly violent film:
[W]ere held to have a duty to warn potential patrons of the risk of attending their movie, they
would have to anticipate that the warning would deter substantial portions of the public from
attending it. And if, under such circumstances, they were held to be responsible for providing
security protection at and in the vicinity of every theater at which the movie is shown,
including public streets, the attendant costs might be substantial indeed. It is thus predictable
that the exposure to liability in such situations would have a chilling effect upon the selection
of subject matter for movies..
Id.
'41 Yakuboicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1067, 1070.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1071.
44 See id.
45 Id. (quoting McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193).
46 Zamnora, 480 F.Supp. 199.
47 Id.
48 YA
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there an allegation as to a specific time period in the ten-year span of
television viewing in which the suggested duty applied to the defendants. 9
The networks moved to dismiss the complaint stating it violated their
First Amendment rights, the duty of care alleged did not exist, and the
complaint completely failed to set forth a legal or factual basis to support the
charge of proximate cause. 0 The court agreed with these positions, and
ruled that merely alleging a duty of care to refrain from violent programming
is not enough to bring a successful claim."s In its opinion, the court stated
that they have to look at all cases that could restrain First Amendment rights
with suspicion. In addition, the court expressed "to permit such a claim by
the person committing the act... would give birth to a legal morass through
which broadcasting would have difficulty finding its way."5'2 Furthermore,
the court concluded that "the imposition of the duty claimed would
discriminate among television productions on the basis of content and not
on the basis of any of the First Amendment limitations."1
3
Similarly, a nine-year old girl, Olivia N., brought an action against NBC
for injuries caused by artificial rape with a bottle by minors who allegedly
were imitating a scene from the televised film Born Innocent.5 Born Innocent
showed a violent sexual attack of a young girl while she was showering.55 In
the film, the attackers raped the girl with a "plumber's helper." s6 In the attack
giving rise to this case, it was alleged that Olivia was artificially raped with a
bottle by a group of minors.57 The plaintiff argues that the film caused the
teenagers to commit an act similar to the one depicted in the film. In
addition, the plaintiff attempted to show NBC had knowledge of studies on
child violence, and argued the defendant should have known "susceptible
persons might imitate the crime enacted in the film.""8 Interestingly, the
49 Id. at 200.
50 Id.
51 Id.
The complaint does not suggest that the event in question was a reaction to any specific
program of an inflammatory nature; or that the minor plaintiff was incited or goaded into
unlawful behavior by a particular call to action. Rather, it is asserted that at some point
(unspecified in any way) he became captive to the violence he viewed and turned to unlawful
conduct.
Id. at 204.
52 Id. at 206.
5 Id.
5 Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888.
5 Id. at 890.
% Id.
57 Id.
Id.
2002]
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plaintiff's counsel, in his opening statement, indicated "that the evidence
would establish negligence and recklessness ... rather than incitement. "s9
The plaintiff contended that when there is negligence, the court should
impose liability absent incitement. Moreover, the plaintiff argued in the
alternative, the court should define incitement differently.' The court
disagreed with the plaintiffs contention, stating that "the chilling effect of
permitting negligence actions for a television broadcast is obvious."6 After
viewing the film, the court determined that the "film did not serve to incite
violent and depraved conduct such as the crimes committed against the
plaintiff."62
The cases mentioned above express the courts' view that although a
movie or film may contain violent depictions, the violence in and of itself
does not automatically strip the media's First Amendment rights. In
addition, these cases represent the courts' position that when a plaintiff
brings a claim against a media defendant, they will have to prove incitement
rather than mere negligence in order to be successful.
C. Music Cases
There have been two teen suicide cases63 brought by the parents of the
deceased against Ozzy Osbourne and CBS Records, alleging Ozzy
Osbourne's song Suicide Solution, which "preaches that suicide is the only
way out," caused the teenagers' deaths. 6' The plaintiffs attempted to establish
liability by arguing incitement. In both cases, the court relied on the
Brandenburg test refined in Hess, and concluded that to find a culpable
incitement, the plaintiffs must prove that: (1) Osbourne's music was directed
and intended toward the goal of bringing about the imminent suicide of
listeners; and (2) It was likely to produce such a result.6"
In Waller v. Osbourne, the parents of the deceased attempted to establish
that Osbourne's song Suicide Solution contained subliminal messages that
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 892. "The fear of damage awards... may be markedly more inhibiting then the fear of
prosecution under a criminal statute. Realistically, television networks would become significantly more
inhibited in the selection of controversial materials if liability were to be imposed on a simple negligence
theory."
6' Id. at 889.
63 See McCollun, 249 Cal Rptr. 187; Waller, 763 F.Supp. 1144.
64 The lyrics of the song Suicide Solution are as follows: "Ah know people... You really know
where it's at... You got it ... Why try, why try... Get the gun and try it... Shoot, shoot, shoot." Id.
at 1146.
6 See McCollumn, 249 Cal Rptr. at 192; See also Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1150-1151.
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were "consciously intelligible only when the music was electronically
adjusted."66 The court stated that they must initially resolve the issue of
whether the song contained subliminal messages since "the presence of a
subliminal message, whose surreptitious nature makes it more akin to false
and misleading commercial speech and other forms of speech extremely
limited in their social value, would relegate the music containing such to a
class worthy of little, if any, First Amendment constitutional protection."67
After careful examination of the song, the court concluded that honoring the
plaintiff's definition of subliminal message "would mean that all rock music
or any music for that matter, which contains unintelligible lyrics could be
found to contain a subliminal message, thereby subjecting an endless number
of performers and producers to possible lawsuits. " '
Although the court held that Osbourne's song did not contain subliminal
messages, the court continued its analysis to determine if it still rose to the
level of incitement. The court concluded that there was no evidence the
"defendants' music was directed toward any particular person or group of
persons," and the plaintiffs had made no showing the defendants' music
should be categorized as speech that "incites imminent lawless behavior."69
The Waller court also stated that even if the song Suicide Solution asserted "in
a philosophical sense that suicide may be a viable option one should consider
in certain circumstances,"70 the audible song lyrics did not rise to the level of
incitement as necessary to hold the creators of the song liable for the
teenager's suicide."7 Furthermore, the court contended that "an abstract
discussion of the moral necessity for a resort to suicide is not the same as
indicating to someone that he should commit suicide and encouraging him
to take such action. "72
The court in McCollum v. CBS73 made similar findings. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs' pleading "failed to allege any basis for
overcoming the bar of the First Amendment's guarantee for free speech and
expression." 74 Moreover, the plaintiffs in McCollum alleged that troubled
teens, a specific target group that Osbourne sought to appeal to, were
extremely susceptible to the influence from a person such as Osbourne who
6 Id. at 1146.
67 Id. at 1148.
68 Id. at 1149.
69 Id. at 1150-51.
70 Id. at 1151.
71 Id.
7r Id.
73 McCollmn, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
74 Id.
20021
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had become a role model to many of them.7 The plaintiffs also alleged that
a special relationship existed between Osbourne and his fans. 76 The court
stated that "musical lyrics and poetry.., are simply not intended to be and
should not be read literally on their face..." and that "no rational person
would or could believe otherwise nor would they mistake musical lyrics for
literal commands or directives to immediate action."' Moreover, the court
concluded that the lyrics of the song can easily be "viewed as a poetic device,
such as a play on words, to convey meanings entirely contrary to those
asserted by the plaintiffs."
7 1
The McCollum court also rejected the plaintiffs' allegations the
defendants "intentionally disseminated to the public music... which overtly
and intentionally intended to cause.., an individual to commit... suicide
or overtly and intentionally aided and/or advised and/or encouraged another
person to commit... suicide."' The court held that some active and
intentional participation in the events leading to the suicide were required in
order to establish a claim of aiding and abetting.'s Given that requirement,
the court concluded the "plaintiff's allegations that the defendants
intentionally produced and distributed Osbourne's music do not
demonstrate that they intentionally aided or encouraged" the teen's suicide."'
The Waller and McCollum decisions have set up a very strong shield of
protection for artists and claims against them. As a result, in order to even
get close to overcoming the hurdles of the First Amendment, a plaintiff
75 Id. at 190.
76 Id. "Osbourne often sang in the first person about himself and about what may be some of the
listener's problems, directly addressing the listener as 'you.'"
7 Id. at 193. See also Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 405907 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (During
a traffic stop, Ronald Howard fatally shot Officer Davidson with a handgun while listening to a cassette
of "2 Pacalypse Now," a recording that was performed by Tupac Amaru Shakur and was produced,
manufactured, and distributed by Time Warner). Id. The court held that the defendants were not liable
for producing the violent music that allegedly caused the death of the police officer. The court expressed
its fear that "permitting the Davidsons to proceed with this litigation, would invariably lead to self-
censorship by broadcasters in order to remove any matter that may be emulated and lead to a law suit."
In addition, the court concluded that although there was no question that "2 Pacalypse Now" depicted
violence, it did "not appear that Shakur intended to incite imminent illegal conduct when he recorded "2
Pacalypse Now." Id. The court also concluded that the mere broadcasting of the song was not likely to
incite or produce illegal violent action," and that "no rational person would or could believe otherwise nor
would they mistake musical lyrics and poetry for literal commands or directives to immediate action."
(quoting McCollumn, 249 Cal Rptr. at 193).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 197.
so Id. at 198.
81 Id. at 18. The court stated it was not sufficient to allege the "defendants intentionally
disseminated Osbourne's music to the general public although they knew, or should have known, that
there were emotionally fragile people who could have an adverse reaction to it."
MEDIA VIOLENCE
bringing a claim against the entertainment industry not only has to show a
direct urging to act in a particular manner, but also has to show the media in
question was supposed to have been taken literally.
D. Game Cases
A mother brought a wrongful death action against the manufacturer of
the game Dungeons and Dragons for the suicide of her son.82 The plaintiff
alleged that her son was an "avid" player ofDungeons and Dragons, and that the
game began to overcome his mind to such an extent that he committed
suicide. 3 Furthermore, the plaintiffalleged the manufacturer violated a duty
of care in publishing and distributing the game." The plaintiff also alleged
the defendant violated a duty to warn the public the game could have
psychological effects on "fragile-minded children."
8
In deciding whether the manufacturer was liable for the death of the
plaintiffs son, the court stated they saw "no indication in the record that the
game's materials glorify or encourage suicide, or even mention it."86 In
addition, the court stated that although strict liability may sometimes be used
when dealing with an inherently dangerous product, the doctrine of strict
liability has never been extended to words or pictures.' Therefore, the court
concluded that in a case such as this one, there could be no recovery of
damages without proof that the defendant violated its duty to exercise
"ordinary care to prevent foreseeable injury."'
Similarly, in the recent case James v. Meow Media, Inc.,' the parents of
three children who were murdered at school by Michael Carneal, a student,
sued the creators and distributors of various video games." The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants "manufactured and/or supplied to Michael
82 Waiters, 904 F.2d 378.
83 Id. at 379.
84 Id.
85 Id.
6 Id.
87 Id. at 380. Other cases in which courts have denied applying strict liability to words and
pictures include Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
publisher of a travel guide could not be held liable for strict liability for reliance on the publication, since
it would seriously inhibit the flow of information); and Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, 833
P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992) (holding that the publisher of the book Entyclopedia of Mushroomns could not be held
liable for strict liability since the book was not considered a product in product liability law, and to impose
a product liability claim would place a severe restriction on the flow of information).
88 Waiters, 904 F.2d at 380.
89 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp.2d 798 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
90 Id.
20021
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Carneal violent video games which made the violence pleasurable and
attractive, and disconnected the violence from the natural consequences
thereof, thereby causing Michael Carneal to act out the violence." 91
Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants "trained Carneal how to point
and shoot a gun in a fashion making him an extraordinarily effective killer
without teaching him any of the constraints or responsibilities needed to
inhibit such a killing capacity. 92
The plaintiffs also claimed the defendants breached the legal duty of care
owed to them by designing, manufacturing, and distributing products they
knew or shpuld have known "were likely to affect minors in such a way as to
result in harm to others," and by "failing to warn the public of the
unreasonably dangerous condition and characteristics of their products and
materials."'93 The court concluded that it was clearly unreasonable to expect
the defendants to have foreseen the injuries caused by Carneal's actions.94
Since the plaintiffs' injuries were unforeseeable, the court concluded that the
defendants did not owe a duty of care.'
The plaintiffs also alleged claims for strict liability due to the "alleged
inherent dangerousness of the products in question."96 The plaintiffs
claimed that the video games were distributed and made in a "defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition" due to their lack of warnings and
content.97 In analyzing this issue, the court concluded that it was not the
"tangible physical characteristics of the products that plaintiffs claim make
the products defective, but instead the intangible thoughts, ideas, and
messages contained within the products." 8 The court concluded these
intangible thoughts, ideas, and messages were not products within the
doctrine of strict liability, and therefore the defendants were not liable. 9
Moreover, the court explained "the theories of liability sought to be imposed
upon the manufacturer of a role-playing fantasy game would have a
devastatingly broad chilling effect on expression of all forms.""°
91 Id. at 802.
r Id.
93 Id. at 804.
9 Id. at 805.
95 Id.
% Id. at 809.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 810.
9 Id. at 811.
100 Id.
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E. Classfied Advertisements and Commercial Speech
Traditionally, courts have not afforded commercial speech the same level
of protection as artistic speech under the First Amendment. It is well settled
that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech "related to
illegal activity."' 0 ' As a result, courts have not applied the Brandenburg
standard when deciding commercial speech cases."°
In Braun, a wrongful death action was brought against Soldier of Fortune
Magazine by the sons of a murder victim. The plaintiff's alleged that the
magazine negligently published an advertisement, submitted by Michael
Savage, that "created an unreasonable risk of solicitation of violent criminal
activity.n1°3 Savage testified that an overwhelming number of the telephone
calls he received in response to the ad dealt with criminal activity such as
murder, assault, and kidnapping.' Two men, responding to Savage's ad,
contacted Savage to discuss plans to murder Richard Braun, and shortly
thereafter, the plan was carried out' 0s The jury in the district court awarded
the plaintiffs two million dollars in damages. The appellate court held the
district court "properly struck the risk-utility balance ",6when giving thejury
instructions, and determined there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
jury's verdict.'0 7
The appeals court held that the jury could find Soldier of Fortune
Magazine liable for printing Savage's ad "only if the advertisement on its face
would have alerted a reasonably prudent publisher to the clearly identifiable
unreasonable risk of harm to the public that the advertisement posed."' 8
Therefore, the magazine publisher did not have a duty to investigate every
101 Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1116 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
1021 See Braun, 968 F.2d at 1 110; See also Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830 (5th
Cir. 1989).
103 See Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110.
104 Id. at 1112. The following advertisement ran in theJune 1985 through March 1986 issues of
Soldier of Fortune: GUN FOR HIRE: 37-year-old professional mercenary desiresjobs. Vietnam Veteran.
Discrete and very private. Body guard, courier, and other special skills. Alljobs considered. Id.
1o Id.
106 Id. at 1114. In applying the risk-utility balancing test, "liability depends upon whether the
burden on the defendant of adopting adequate precautions is less than the probability of harm from the
defendant's unmodified conduct multiplied by the gravity of the injury that might result from the
defendant's unmodified conduct." Id. See Risenhoover v. England, 936 F.Supp 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996)
(holding the First Amendment did not immunize newspaper or television stations from liability for
negligence associated with news gathering activities).
107 Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110.
1o Id. at 1114-15.
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ad it published."° Moreover, the court held that imposing liability on a
magazine for publishing ads that "on its face created a clear risk of substantial
danger of harm to the public did not violate the First Amendment.""0
Another case dealing with commercial advertising is Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine.' In Eimann, the son and mother of a murder victim
brought a wrongful death action against Soldier ofFortune Magazine alleging
that the magazine published a "personal service ad through which the
victim's husband hired an assassin to kill her."" 2 The district court
instructed the jury that it could find the magazine liable, "if a reasonable
publisher would conclude that the advertisement could reasonably be
interpreted as an offer to commit crimes."" 3  The jury found for the
plaintiffs. On appeal, the jury's verdict was reversed." 4 After applying the
Texas risk-utility balancing principles, the court concluded "the standard of
conduct imposed by the district court against Soldier of Fortune Magazine
was too high," in that it would require a publisher to reject all ambiguous
claims." s Furthermore, the court stated that "Soldier of Fortune owed no
duty to refrain from publishing a facially innocuous classified advertisement
when the ad's context- at most- made its message ambiguous.""1
6
Some speculate that Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc.,7 has been categorized as
a commercial speech case, since the court deviated from the strict application
of the Brandenburg standard. In Weirum, a radio broadcaster was held liable
for negligence in sponsoring a radio contest in which it was foreseeable that
listeners, in order to win a prize, would race in their cars from place to place
in order to arrive first at a particular destination."' The contest encouraged
its largely teenage listening audience to be the first to locate "the real Don
Steele," a disc jockey, at various places as he traveled around the Los Angeles
area." 9 During Steele's broadcast, he exclaimed, "9:30 and the real Don
Steele is back on his feet again with some money and is headed for the Valley.
109 Id. at 1119.
11o Id. at 1110.
Ht Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cit. 1989).
112 Id. The ad which ran in the September, October, and November 1984 issues of Soldier of
Fortune read: Ex-marines 67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialist--jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high
risk assignments, U.S. or overseas. Id. at 831.
113 Id. at 838.
114 Id. at 833.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). See also Laura Brill, The First Anendnent
and the Power of Suggestion: Protecting "Negligent" Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harn, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 984
(1994).
its Id. at 40.
119 Id. at 38.
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Thought I would give you a warning so that you can get your kids out of the
street." 2°
The family of a man who was killed when a listener who was trying to
locate Steele forced his car off the highway, brought a wrongful death action
against the radio station.121 The court concluded that, implicit in Steele's
speech itself, was a live interactive dynamic that urged dangerous activity.
Moreover, the court stated it was foreseeable Steele's teenage listeners would
race to arrive first at a site, and would disregard highway safety.122 The court
reasoned that "the First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of
physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act." '2
Therefore, the court concluded that the First Amendment would not bar a
plaintiff's action where it was foreseeable that the speech in question would
create an undue risk of harm.
However, the fact that a live interactive dynamic was present between the
speaker and audience, and that the speech was meant to be taken literally,
makes Weirum a unique case. Although it is possible that other cases will
possess these characteristics, a strong shield still exists, since it would be
extremely difficult to carve out liability based on these factors.
F. The Successes
Recently, some courts have relaxed the Brandenburg prongs of likelihood
and imminence, and have created a different slant on how courts review
media cases. 24 One case in which the court has held that the First
Amendment does not bar civil liability against a media defendant is Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc.125 In Rice, a man named Lawrence Horn hired James
Perry to murder his eight year old quadriplegic son, his son's nurse, and his
ex-wife so that he could receive the two million dollars his son was awarded
in a settlement for his paralyzing injuries. 26 In preparing for and committing
these murders, Perry, a contract killer, closely followed many of the
instructions contained in the bookHitMan:A Technical Manualforlndependent
Contractors.'2  The relatives of the three victims brought a wrongful death
1-0 Id.
121 Id. at 39.
122 See id. at 40.
123 Id.
124 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 233. See also Byers, 712 So. 2d 681.
125 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 233.
126 Id. at 239.
1-7 Id. Perry followed the instructions of Hit Man almost word for word on "requesting expense
money from the employer prior to committing the crime," where to commit the murder, to use a rental
car to reach the victim's location, to establish a base at a motel in close proximity to the "job site," to use
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action against Paladin, the publisher of Hit Man, for civilly aiding and
abetting Perry in committing the murders. 128
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Paladin, and
the victims' relatives appealed. Paladin, for purposes of summaryjudgment,
stipulated that, in marketing Hit Man, not only had Paladin intended to
"attract and assist criminals and would-be criminals... [but] intended and
had knowledge that Hit Man would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and
would-be criminals to plan and execute the crime of murder for hire." 29
After a thorough review of caselaw dealing with aiding and abetting, the
court held the First Amendment does not pose a bar to a finding of civil
liability as an aider and/or abettor. 30 Unlike the court in McCollum, the Rice
court took a broader formulation of intent when analyzing the requirements
for aiding and abetting. The court held that the solicitation to a group of
catalogue subscribers for no other reason than to attract and assist criminals
and would-be criminals should reach the jury. 3 ' In addition, the court
explained that Brandenburgwas meant to protect abstract advocacy and not literal
factual instructions.u2 The court stated it was well established that "speech,
which is tantamount to the legitimately proscribable non expressive conduct,
may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished or regulated. .. .
Moreover, the court emphasized that it found Hit Man to be "reprehensible
and devoid of any significant redeeming social value,"134 and that even absent
the publisher's stipulations, Hit Man is at "the other end of the continuum
from the ideation at the core of the advocacy protected by the First
Amendment.""3- The court also concluded that it was satisfied that a jury
could "readily find that the provided instructions (of Hit Man) not only have
no, or virtually no, non-instructional communicative value, but also that
their only instructional communicative value is the indisputably illegitimate
one of training persons how to murder and to engage in the business of
murder for hire."'
36
a made up tag number, and what type of rifle to use to kill the victim. Perry also followed numerous
instructions on how to commit the murder itself For example, he followed the manual's instructions to
kill their "mark" at close range, not shoot the victim at point blank, and to shoot the victim through the
eyes, if possible. Id. at 240.
128 Id. at 241.
19 Id.
130 Id. at 243.
131 Id. at 253.
132 Id. at 263.
133 Id. at 243.
134 Id. at 249.
135 Id. at 256.
136 Id. at 249.
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In effect, the Rice holding has put a dent in the artform exception used in
McCollum and Waller. After the court's analysis of Rice, it is possible that a
mass marketed media work involving factual technical instruction can
potentially create a jury issue.
Similarly, the Supreme Court sent a chill through Hollywood by
allowing a lawsuit to move forward against Time Warner and director Oliver
Stone. 37 The Byers suit relied heavily on Rice. In Byers, it was alleged that
after repeatedly watching the defendants' movie Natural Born Killers, two
teenagers went on a murderous rampage imitating scenes from the movie."'
Byers, who was paralyzed as a result of the teenagers' shooting spree, sued
based on negligence and intentional tort theories.'39 Byers contended that
Time Warner and Oliver stone should have known that the film would
"cause or incite people such as Edmondson and Darrus to commit violent
acts . . ." that were glorified by the movie Natural Born Killers.14 Moreover,
Byers alleged that the Warner defendants did not warn viewers of the
"potential deleterious effects that repeated viewing of the film can have on
teenage viewers.141
The defendants filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no
cause of action, and the trial court dismissed Byers' claims against the
defendants. The appellate court, however, reversed the findings and allowed
the intentional tort action to go forward. 42 Without even viewing the film,
the court found that under the allegations of the petition accepted as true, the
defendants may have owed a duty to Byers.' 43 The court stated that if Byers
could prove the defendants "intended to urge viewers to imitate the criminal
conduct of... the main characters in the film, then the risk of harm would
be imminently foreseeable, justifying the imposition of a duty upon the
defendants to refrain from creating such a film."'" Moreover, the court
stated that they must accept Byers' allegation, that the defendants intended
to incite viewers, as true. Once accepted as true, the court concluded that the
film would fall into the unprotected category of "speech directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action."145 The Byers decision implicates that
as long as allegations taken as true on its face, allege incitement, then a
plaintiff can sue a media defendant.
137 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 25, 1999) (discussing Byers, 712 So. 2d 681).
13 See id. at 684. The film is alleged to have been involved in more than a dozen copycat killings.
139 Id. at 687.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 692.
143 Id.
14 Id. at 688.
145 See id. at 689.
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III. MEDIA LIABILITY AND RICE'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The holding of Rice has affected the future of the entertainment industry
in regard to: (1) The content of future films, television shows, music, and
literature based upon a concern of lawsuits; and (2) Rice's implication in a
time of terrorism.
A. The Content of Media in the Future
The Byers decision depicts the way in which courts may interpret the
holding of Rice in the future. This interpretation, in effect, could reduce the
First Amendment's protection not only for instructional manuals, but for a
variety of violent movies, literature, and music as well. 146 Critics argue that
Rice and Byers have opened the floodgates to lawsuits for imitative harm.
147
No doubt, an answer that members of the entertainment industry are
searching for is whether Rice and Byers are setting new precedent for the
industry to be concerned about. 148 In response to the criticism of the Rice
decision that recognizing a cause of action in Rice would subject broadcasters
and publishers to liability whenever someone imitates what is described or
depicted in their broadcasts, publications, or movies, the Rice court stated:
This is simply not true. In the copycat context, it will presumably
never be the case that the broadcaster or publisher actually intends,
through its description or depiction, to assist another or others in the
commission of a violent crime; rather, the information for the
dissemination of which liability is sought to be imposed will actually
have been misused vis-A-vis the use intended. It would be difficult
to overstate the significance of this difference insofar as the potential
liability to which the media might be exposed by our decision herein
is concerned. 149
146 See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Taming Terrorists But Not Natural Born Killers, 27 N. KY. L. REv.
81(2000).
147 After Rice and Byers, plaintiffs may be encouraged to bring a lawsuit against a media defendant.
SeeJames, 90 F. Supp.2d 798 (dismissing a $130 million suit brought by the parents of three murdered
girls against the producers and distributors of the movie, The Basketball Diaries; the parents insisted that
a scene from the movie was to blame for the death of their daughters).
148 SeeJonathan Seiden, Screaming For a Solution: Regulating Hollywood Violence; An Analysis of Legal
and Legislative Remedies, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1010, 1027 (2001).
149 See Rice. 128 F.3d at 265.
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Moreover, many believe that Rice is a rare case, since the publisher had
"stipulated in almost taunting defiance that it intended to assist murderers
and other criminals." 150
Although society as a whole wants to protect individuals from the
possible harm that can result from violent images depicted in the media,
punishing the entertainment industry by allowing copycat cases to proceed
in court can have disastrous effects. 151 If courts permit negligence actions to
proceed against media defendants, the freedom of speech will be chilled. 2
It is important to remember that "it is simply not acceptable to a free and
democratic society to impose a duty upon performing artists to limit and
restrict their creativity in order to avoid the dissemination of ideas in artistic
speech which may adversely affect emotionally troubled individuals." 53
Imposing such a burden would "quickly have the effect of reducing and
limiting artistic expression to only the broadest standard of taste and
acceptance and the lowest level of offense, provocation, and controversy." 15 4
In discussing why negligence actions against the entertainment industry
violates an artist's freedom of speech, entertainment lawyer Robert Vanderet
stated, "if we're going to have a society where we are only going to allow the
distribution of films and movies that are not going to provoke, or may not
provoke a response in some aberrant individuals, we're going to be watching
Bambi without the shooting of the mother.., because we can not predict
what exactly is going to set off a particular individual."'55 Furthermore, Mr.
Vanderet explained that we can not, in a society, allow access to films and
books be "determined by the least common denominator."5 6 In addition,
media liability for third party actions is likely to lead to self-censorship, since
the industry would be unable to predict which images depicted in the media
would lead to mimicry.157 The fact that producers, directors, artists, and
other members of the entertainment industry will not be able to determine
which speech will subject them to liability raises severe First Amendment
concerns.
58
Another implication of allowing actions against the media to proceed in
court is that free expression under the First Amendment is not given
complete protection if it depends on the decision of ajury. Thisjury issue
150 Id.
151 See Seiden, supra note 148, at 1027.
152 See id. at 1028.
153 Id. at 1029 (quoting McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197).
154 Id.
155 60 minutes, supra note 137.
156 Id.
157 Brill, supra note 117, at 1003.
158 See id.
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was apparent in Rice, when the court left it to the jury to decide whether the
manual in question had a legitimate literary and artistic purpose or whether
its real purpose was to aid in murder. s9 Allowing juries to decide whether
a media defendant is liable for damages would almost certainly result in the
"suppression of unpopular points ofview."' 6° Juries, "with their majoritarian
biases, have been criticized for their unwillingness to protect controversial or
unpopular speech." 16' Thejuror's view of the utility of the speech will likely
depend on his or her fondness for the message that the speech sends. In
addition, risk assessments will likely be connected to the juror's appreciation
of the content of the speech. 62 Therefore, thejury would be given the power
to decide what movies, television shows, novels, and music have political,
artistic, or literary merit. Moreover, since placing liability on media
defendants would create a chilling effect on the whole entertainment
industry, the jury would also have to "consider the social utility of all speech
that would be left unspoken because of the inhibiting effects of liability." 63
This task is something that juries may not be capable of doing.
B. Rice's Implication in a Time of Terrorism
Recent terrorist events have increased the need for a new approach in
dealing with reference sources, including the Internet, that describe detailed
instructions in manufacturing bombs, destructive devices, and other weapons
of mass destruction.' 64 The Department ofJustice's study on the availability
of instructional information confirmed that any member of the public at
large who desired such information could easily obtain it. 65 Evidence
suggests that in numerous crimes involving destructive devices and weapons,
the defendants have relied upon instructions from accessible published
,59 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
160 See Brill, supra note 117, at 1003.
161 See id. (discussing Lillian R. Bevier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 229,309-311 (1978)).
62 See Brill, supra note 117, at 1003.
163 Id. at 1004.
164 DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITYOF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION,
THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO
WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1997).
165 Id. at 5. At least fifty publications dealing with such information were found. They include
DEADLY BREW: ADVANCED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES (Paladin Press, 1987), THE ANARCHIST'S
HANDBOOK (. Flores, 1995), IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES: HOW TO MAKE YOUR OWN (Paladin Press,
1985), and the ANARCHIST ARSENAL (Harber, 1992).
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information.'6 6 For instance, following the 1993 terrorist bombing of the
World Trade Center, bombmaking manuals were found in the possession of
the individuals responsible for the act of terrorism. 67 It is also believed that
since the availability of this information is now increasingly accessible over
the Internet and other sources, such instructional information "will continue
to play a significant role in aiding those who intend upon committing future
acts of terrorism and violence."' .
In dealing with this concerning issue, the question arises as to whether
an instructional manual could subject the speaker to criminal liability. If a
strict reading of Brandenburg applied, a writer or publisher who has the
"purpose of generally assisting unknown and unidentified readers in the
commission of crimes," would probably not be held liable for creating a
general publication of explosives information, since the speech was not
directed at a specific person or group. 69  Moreover, if Brandenburg's
imminence requirement was read literally, a writer could not be punished if
he wrote instructional information about weapons for terrorist purposes if
a year passed before anyone used the information for a terrorist attack.
However, people writing, publishing, and selling instructional
information can be prosecuted for specific intent regardless of Brandenburg's
imminence and likelihood prongs. It is also a possibility that in our country's
current battle with terrorism, the imminence and likelihood prongs would
be met due to the severity of the circumstances.
It has been suggested that "otherwise privileged publication of
information can lose its First Amendment protection when the publisher has
an impermissible motive." 170 In a "serious threat to American national
security," such as our nation's current state, Haig v. Agee, supports the
argument that publications of dangerous instructional information can be
punishable by the government where the publication is motivated by an
intent to aid in unlawful use of explosive and destructive devices. 7 ' It has
been argued that in such an instance, the "Brandenburg requirement that the
facilitated crime be imminent should be little, if any, relevance." 72
During a senate debate on the need for additional laws relating to the
dissemination of bombmaking information, two sets of circumstances in
which such information should be prohibited were identified. The
166 DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, supra note 164, at 3.
167 Id. at 8.
168 Id. at 3.
169 Id. at 24.
170 Id. (discussing Hiag v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)).
171 Id.
1'r Id.
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circumstances for prohibition are: (1) "Where the person disseminating the
information intends that it be used for unlawful ends;" and (2) "Where the
person disseminating the information has good reason to know that a
particular potential recipient thereof plans to use that information to engage
in unlawful activities.' '173  According to the factors above, published
instructional information dealingwith devices that could be used for terrorist
crime would be looked at according to the writer's, publisher's, or seller's
intent and the conscious purpose of bringing about the crime. As a result of
our present state of war, it would be beneficial and wise to adopt further
legislation, like the one presented above, to directly address the significant
role that instructional literature may play in aiding those who intend on
using weapons and other explosive devices for criminal purposes, as well as
terrorist acts. 74
IV. REGULATING THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
There has been great conce'n about the entertainment industry's practice
of marketing violent entertainment to children. Most "people would agree
that the entertainment media plays a powerful role in the formation of
values, especially the values of very young children." 175 Moreover, it has
been found that children have a hard time separating fiction from reality
when watching violent images portrayed in the media.
176
A. Regulation and The FTC Report
In response to a request from President Clinton in1999, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) conducted a study on the marketing of violent
entertainment to children and teenagers. 77 The report found that even
though the entertainment industry had taken measures to identify content
that may not be suitable for children, the industry still regularly targeted
children under seventeen in the marketing of products that their own ratings
systems deem inappropriate, or where parental caution due to violent content
would be exercised. 17 The FTC Report stated that "the practice of pervasive
173 Id. at 15.
174 Id. at 10.
175 Seiden, supra note 148, at 1010.
176 60 Minutes, supra note 137.
in See FEDERALTRADE COMMISSION, MARKETING VIOLENTENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN:
A REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC
RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES I (2000) [hereinafter FTC Repon].
17 See id. at iii.
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and aggressive marketing of violent movies ... to children undermines the
credibility of the industries' ratings and labels."' 79 Such marketing also
"frustrates parents' attempts to make informed decisions about their
children's exposure to violent content."1
80
The FTC Report made important findings illustrating the clear problems
of the industry's marketing and advertising strategies. One issue that the
FTC was concerned about was the high amount of violence shown in movie
trailers before the feature movie was shown in a theater. 8 ' The FTC Report
discovered that there were many trailers that were labeled as "approved for
all audiences" that contained violent images. 18z For example, the all audience
trailer for I Know 14hat You Did Last Summer contained references to
mutilations and drug use. Also, in a trailer for Scream 2, there were many
violent scenes including a knife-wielding killer chasing a woman.183 In
addition, the FTC found that R-rated movie trailers were being shown at
movies that were rated PG and PG-13.ls4
The FTC also found that of the forty-four R-rated movies the
commission used for its research, thirty-five of the movies (80%) were
explicitly targeted to children under seventeen. ls Moreover, studio records
indicate that children under the age of seventeen were included in marketing
research events. Audiences that included teens under seventeen viewed
thirty-three of the forty-four R-rated films in the FTC's study. 186 Marketing
research in eight of the films included children as young as twelve years
old.
187
Another area of concern is television advertising. Research shows that
moviegoers, especially teenagers, learn of particular movies while watching
television. Consequently, studios target movie advertisements for certain
times of the day in order to reach their teenage audience. 8 Such times
include after school, before prime time programming at 8 P.M., and on the
weekends. 8 9 MTV for example, with a majority of its viewers between the
19 See Seiden, supra note 148, at 1029 (discussing the FTC Report, supra note 177, at i).
180 FTC Report, supra note 177, at i.
181 Id. at 9.
18 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 16-17.
Ms Id. at 13.
186 Id.
187 Id.
'8 Id. at 14-15.
189 Id.
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ages of twelve to twenty-four, was the largest cable medium for almost all the
movies the commission examined. 9 '
The FTC also studied the entertainment industry's practice of marketing
explicit content music recordings to children.' 9' The FTC found that of the
fifty-five music recordings with explicit content labels the commission used
in their study, all of the recordings were targeted to children under
seventeen. Fifteen of the recordings had marketing plans that "expressly
identified children under seventeen as part of their target audience."' 92
The FTC commission also researched the marketing of violent M-rated
electronic games to children.'9 3 In conducting their study, the FTC found
that of the 118 electronic games with a mature rating that the commission
used in its study, eighty-three games targeted children under seventeen. The
marketing documents for the other twenty-three games, included "plans to
advertise the games in magazines or on television shows with a majority
under seventeen audience."'
94
In response to the apparent problems found by the FTC, the
Commission suggested certain measures that would help the motion picture,
music recording, and electronic game industries enhance their self-regulating
efforts.' 95 These suggestions include:
[C]omprehensive ratings or labels that provide parents with
meaningful information about the nature, intensity, and
appropriateness for children of depictions of violence; an accurate
and consistent rating or labeling process with clear standards; clear
and conspicuous disclosures of the rating or label- with related age
and content information on packaging and in advertising; and sales
and marketing policies that are consistent with the ratings or
labels. 196
Since the First Amendment affords protection against the government
regulation of the content of various forms of media, self-regulation is
extremely important. It would be very hard for the legislature and courts to
create a regulation that could effectively monitor what children would be
190 Id. at 15.
191 Id. at 31.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 45.
11A Id.
195 Id. at 53.
1% Id.
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viewing. 97 Since we as a society have changed our view of what constitutes
violence, the meaning of violence would raise numerous questions. In
addition, it would be hard to determine what types of violence a child should
and should not be viewing. 98 For instance, many movies such as Schindler's
List are in fact violent, but also have important educational and social value.
Moreover, the Evening News, which usually contains violence, is a major
channel for obtaining information about daily events. It is also important to
remember that any restrictions placed on the industry should be limited to
the exposure of violence to children, and should not affect the flow of
information to the adult population.199
Because of the First Amendment's protections, it is up to the
entertainment industry as a whole to improve on the already existing self-
imposed regulation system. However, even with a more effective system of
regulation, it will be up to the parents "to become familiar with the ratings
and labels, and with the movies, music, and games their children enjoy, so
that they can make informed choices about their children's exposure to
entertainment with violent content."
200
B. The V-Chip and Television Ratings
In response to congress' warnings and parents' concerns about the
violence shown on television, the television industry established a rating
system that identifies when a program contains "sex, violence, or
language.,,20' These ratings appear on the corner of the television screen at
the beginning of a program. However, many believe that these ratings are
"little utility to most parents" since they only appear for a few seconds, and
unless you are watching the very beginning of a program, you will not see the
rating at all.2°2
In addition to the television rating system, a technological device called
the V-chip was created. The V-chip allows parents to block out programs on
their television sets that contain inappropriate content such as violence and
sex.20 3 Many people believe that the V-chip will be extremely useful when
19 See Seiden, supra note 148, at 1034.
198 Id.
199 Id.
S FTC Report, supra note 177, at 53.
.,o' Benjamin C. Zipursky et a, Panel 1: The V-Chip and the Constitutionality of Television Ratings, 8
FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 303 (1998).
2 Id.
1" Id. at 305.
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children are between the ages of two and seven years old.2 °4 Benjamin
Zipursky, a professor at Fordham University School of Law, explained that
the point of the V-chip was that you do not need the television rating to
appear on the screen in order for the rating to be useful.05 Instead, a "signal
will be sent over the air to V-chips, that, if activated by the owner of a
television set, will block out specific programs, preventing viewers from ever
seeing that material."2  Although most parents consider the V-chip a
"welcomed development," broadcasters view the V-chip and the use of
ratings as a threat, and argue that they "constitute censorship in violation of
the First Amendment."20 7 In response to the broadcasters' claim that the V-
chip violates the First Amendment, Mr. Zipursky explained that censorship
is supposed to mean an "official attempt to control what you can see or
hear." 208 The V-chip law, however, does not require the television industry
to provide television ratings, but rather mandates that television set
manufacturers build V-chips into television sets.2° The television industry
decides what rating a particular program should receive, not the government.
Furthermore, it is not the government, but the parents who decided whether
to use the ratings .210 In response to the criticism that the ratings system
constitutes censorship, many analysts have stated that television ratings are
"similar to a label on a can of soup," since the ratings simply tell the
consumer what is in the product.2 1' For example, one program may contain
violence and sexual content.
Although the V-chip and the television rating system provide a method
to detect violence and sex on television, not everyone agrees that the V-chip,
in actuality, will be helpful to parents. Critics argue that the V-chip and the
rating system will create an excuse for the television industry to provide
"morally unacceptable programming. 212 They claim that the industry would
respond to complaints about the contents of programming by telling viewers
to block out unacceptable programming by using the V-chip.213 Critics also
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say that no rating system will ever be perfect.214 Many parents will not use
the rating system and those who do use the ratings may not use it wisely.
2 1
Dick Wolf, the producer of the television show Law and Order, believes
that "ratings might be the most serious threat to free speech since the
beginning of broadcast television."2 6 Moreover, Wolf and many others are
concerned that ratings could become "a litmus test for sponsors and
advertisers." 217 For example, advertisers might not want to be associated with
shows that were given an L rating for harsh language.
Although we as a society have not yet found a perfect solution to violence
and sex in the media, the V-chip, and the television rating system is a step in
the right direction. As Mr. Zipursky explained, "ratings and the V-chip help
busy parents restore control over the mayhem" seen on television.218
Moreover, "it is parents taking control of the television set away from the
brokers of power. 
"219
V. VIOLENCE IN A TIME OF TERRORISM
In today's time of terrorism, the entertainment industry is faced with a
reality unlike ever before.220 In light of the September 11th terrorist attacks,
the entertainment industry is struggling to understand the new rules for
violence in action movies, television, and books. 22' For years, authors such
as Tom Clancy have written shivering stories of "terror grounded in
plausibility." m These stories involved plots such as terrorists plotting to
unleash lethal chemicals through a sprinkler system at the Olympics, and
pilots crashing their planes into the Capital building.' Most people left one
of Clancy's stories relieved to remember that it was only a story and that
"even though he's shown you how these things could happen, they really
couldn't... Some things, we think, are simply to horrible to happen.
" 224
However, recently we have certainly learned differently.
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Because of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the public's tolerance to
violence has changed. There are probably millions of people for whom
stories of terrorism and destruction have lost their appeal. 22 This is the
problem that the entertainment industry is faced with today. The industry
is "competing with a truth that shames fiction."
226
In response to Americans' new sensitivity, the entertainment industry has
made changes in certain films that no longer seem appropriate. 27 A Tim
Allen comedy about a bomb on a plane, and a Jackie Chan movie about a
window washer who discovers a terrorist plot to blow up the World Trade
Center, have both been pulled from showing in theaters. 228 In trying to
follow the market's needs, the entertainment industry could be "forced to
make an even more fundamental adjustment in its treatment of violence."229
Before September 11th the American public was not only used to seeing, but
also was entertained by films that involved terrorist plots, destruction, and
violence. "Once upon a time, it was fun to watch unthinkable things. But
everything is different now.., nothing is unthinkable anymore. "2
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment's protection of free speech should, in most
circumstances, bar a plaintiff's claim against the entertainment industry.
Since the media *does enjoy strong First Amendment protection, it is
important for the industry to enforce self-regulation policies and to
scrutinize their own work product. Furthermore, faced with our country's
new reality, the entertainment industry is wrestling with the question of
what happens to violence portrayed in the media. The answer seems to be
that only time will tell.
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